Abstract:
This paper deals with the ethical issues concerning living organ donor transplantation in the context
of Immanuel Kant’s Ethical Theory. It primarily aims to refute the common perception about
Kant’s categorical opposition to organ transplantation as violative to his concept of duty of selfpreservation
(transplantation as a form of mutilation or partial suicide). In this paper we will argue
that: 1) Kantian concept of mutilation, or partial self-murder, should be perceived within the
context of Kant’s prohibition of killing oneself; 2) Kant does not prohibit all forms of organ donation
as contrary to duty of self-preservation (i.e., duty to maintain quality of life and donation as
violative to the strict prohibition against mutilation). Organ donation could hardly be considered
as mutilation or contrary to duty of self-preservation if the following conditions are satisfied: 1)
the organ to be donated and the surgical procedure involved, would not pose grave risk (e.g. physical
disability and death) to the donor; and 2) the moral personality of the donor would not be at
risk by donating his organ.
