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Additive Property and the Physical Reducibility of the Mind

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dc.contributor.author Hyun, Kwangho
dc.date.accessioned 2018-07-24T09:51:19Z
dc.date.available 2018-07-24T09:51:19Z
dc.date.issued 2014-05
dc.identifier.citation Open Journal of Philosophy, 2014, 4, 91-95 en_US
dc.identifier.issn 2163-9442
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2014.42013
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2002
dc.description.abstract It is controversial whether the mind is physically reducible or not. If the mind is physically reducible, it must share properties with the physical world. To find out how the mind can be characterized, an “additive property” is used to describe the mind. The additive property is shown where many causes result in one effect. The additive property is shown in the biological domain when the senses process received input. It is also shown in the intellectual activities of daily life. In the physical world, there is no cause without an effect. The additive property of events is not satisfied in physical domain. If the mind is physically reducible, the additive property of the mind should not be satisfied. Because the additive property is shown in the mind, the mind cannot be physically reduced in terms of relationships of cause and effects. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Scientific Research en_US
dc.subject Additive Property en_US
dc.subject Reducibility en_US
dc.subject Causality en_US
dc.subject Neuron en_US
dc.subject Mind Body en_US
dc.title Additive Property and the Physical Reducibility of the Mind en_US
dc.type Article en_US


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